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S U M M A R Y
The P olitics o f R ed is trib u tio n  w ith  G ro w th
Col in  Leys
This article challenges the po litica l assumptions w hich, it argues, 
characterize R ed is trib u tio n  w ith  G r o w th : that a large number of Third 
W orld countries w ill continue to  be predom inantly capitalist, and that 
poverty relief should be attempted through redistributive policies 
w h ich  w ill arouse m inim um opposition from  the ir ruling classes. The 
contrad ictions in these assumptions are reflected in RwG's analysis 
o f the determ inants o f poverty, w hich excludes the structural and 
po litica l forces o f capitalist underdevelopm ent; in its rejection of 
class analysis and the substitution o f arbitrarily defined 'target g ro u p s '; 
in its proposed 'index o f performance', intended to replace GNP as a 
measure; and in the pessimism and indeterm inacy o f RwG's analysis of 
the prospects for its actual adoption as a strategy. Finally, the orig ins and 
context o f R wG must be taken in to  account in assessing its assumption 
that radical change is "u n lik e ly " in much o f the Third W orld ; it is 
argued that the nature and approach o f RwG are such as to  make such 
change less likely.
R ed is trib u tio n  w ith  G ro w th — a reply
Richard J o lly
A lthough Colin Leys argues that R ed is tr ib u tio n  w ith  G ro w th  is 
directed against revolutionary change, th is  article shows the charge to 
be un justified. The quantita tive models w hich the IB R D /ID S  volum e 
develops to  analyse d istribution and grow th, and the basic strategies 
considered, are as equally applicable to  socialist as to  cap ita lis t trans­
form ations. It is not RwG w h ich  rules out radical change—it is rather 
Colin Leys w ho attempts to rule out serious consideration of 
w ha t m ight be done to  alleviate poverty and improve incom e 
d is tribution when radical change appears very unlike ly. This article 
elaborates these points, beginning w ith  a summary o f the basic 
argument of RwG and conclud ing w ith  an alternative statement of the 
weaknesses in RwG and o f fru itfu l d irections fo r fu ture  w ork  and 
refinement.
A C o m m en t
M ontek Ah/uwalia , Clive Bell, H o llis  Chenery, Joh n  D uloy  
These com ments on Professor Leys' article do not constitu te  a 
re joinder in the ordinary sense o f the term. They sim ply h igh ligh t 
certain aspects of the argument in RwG fo r those w ho  have read Leys, 
but not the book itself.
R ed is trib u tio n  w ith  G ro w th — a n d /o r  T ran s itio n  to  S o cia lis t 
D eve lo p m en t
R eginald Her bo ld  Green
Tanzania's 1961-74  po litica l econom ic dynam ic is examined w ith  
emphasis on strategic themes, major changes and critical obstacles, 
and the pace o f change. A  brief summary o f 1961-73 developm ent 
covers income distribution, mode of production, mass needs and grow th 
o f productive forces. The po litica l nature o f the planning process, the 
pattern o f po litica l-techn ica l interaction and the stress on utiliz ing 
crises fo r advance rather than retrenchment are central to  an under­
standing o f Tanzanian po litica l econom ic change. TAN U 's role as the 
dom inant po litica l force and the  po tentia lly  retarding interests of high 
level manpower and rural elites are noted as w ell as the special problems 
o f informal sector developm ent in the context o f a transition to 
socialism. The ways in w h ich  Tanzanian experience is relevant to 
other peripheral economies— and the hazards in attem pting to  make 
such generalizations— are considered briefly.
N e w  Light on C hina 's  P o litica l Econom y
Jo h n  G ittings
M ost Western w ritin g  on Chinese econom ic developm ent since 1949 
has, until recently, treated it in isolation from  the broader goal of 
bu ild ing and consolidating a socialist society. In fact the Chinese 
choice o f strategies and priorities can on ly  be understood w ith in  th is  
context. New material from  China, inc lud ing some previously un pub­
lished w ritings  on po litica l econom y by Mao Tse-tung, show  more 
clearly how  the Chinese see the path o f the ir transition to  socialism 
and the problems arising along the way. This has been the central issue 
o f Chinese po litica l life since the m id-1950s and it has been strongly 
influenced by the m ainly negative lessons o f the Soviet (and especially 
S ta lin ist) experience. A bib liography gives details o f the new Chinese 
material, and o f recent Western w ork w h ich  opens up fresh perspectives.
here the leadership see (in different 
objectives as subsumed within the 
he socio-economic structure, in ways 
nleash social incentives. Indirectly, 
phasize aspects underlined by Colin 
e com m on feature  w'hich is notable 
;t of  this controversy  is that both 
fears of the leadership that the 
onsidered inevitable in a transition 
be perpetuated  through property 
d political power.
T anzania ,  by Reginald Green, is an 
iplif ication of his country  study in 
y John  Gittings draws on two new' 
ches by C hairm an  M ao  and the 
the National People's Congress held 
year) and it ends with a useful 
of w ork  on C hina  which is particu- 
for those working in the develop-
owed by two reviews by IDS Fellows 
jblished w orks on leading topics in 
yment policy and the choice of 
ie first review is by H ans  Singer, 
i h imself one of the leading inno­
field (as in a num ber of others). In 
he invented the term RwG  while 
he 1LO mission to K enya (led by 
Richard Jolly), a mission whose 
Iwork led to the reconsideration of 
incepts and theories in the develop-
i s ’ review brings out, of course 
w influential the K enya report has 
evisionism’ in the development field, 
:cted attitudes even in the citadels of 
ver and theoretical orthodoxy. His 
plicitly of the theoretical approach 
n m o n  at the end of the 1960s, when 
eport and the Second Development 
aents were issued. This seems a long 
nigh the approach  lingers on: the
itv  P re s s ,  1974. R e a d e rs  u n fa m ilia r  w ith  it 
th e  s e c o n d  se c t io n  o f  R ic h a rd  Jo lly ’s p a p e r, 
th e m e s  a re  s u m m a riz e d . A  tec h n ic a l in n o v atio n  
» h ic h  is n o t  d isc u s s e d  d i re c tly  in  th is  issue , 
a r - r e a c h in g  e ffe c ts , b e c a u s e  it  w ill im m ed ia te ly  
tin g  official a s  r e le v a n t ,  is th e  d e m o n s tra t io n  
re  im p lic a tio n s  of an y  g ro w th  in  in co m e 
h o w  o n e  w 'e igh ts th e  in c re a se  in  th e  incom e 
im e  g ro u p s .
lo u g h  a F e llo w  of I D S ,  h a s  b e e n  w ork ing  
:he B a n k , a n d  jo in e d  th e  th r e e  B an k  au th o rs  
i i r  re p ly .
1
Redistribution with Growth—and or Transition  
to Socialist Development
Som e Jottings on Tanzania 1961-74 ____________ ____________________________
R eg ina ld  H erbo ld  Green
E ven  the longest journey starts with the first 
step.
Chinese Proverb
T an zan ia  is a ttempting to achieve change by 
deliberate  policy, and to maintain order by 
involving all the people in both the direction 
and  the process of change. We are under no 
illusions abo u t  the difficulty of the task we have 
undertaken .  With few socialists we are trying 
to build socialism; with few people conscious 
o f  the basic requirements of democracy we are 
try ing to achieve change by democratic means; 
w ith  few technicians we are trying to effect a 
fun d am en ta l  transform ation  of our economy. 
A n d  with an educated elite whose whole 
teaching encouraged motives of individualistic 
advancem ent,  we are trying to create an 
egali tar ian  society.
M w a l im u  Julius K .  N yerere
While partic ipating in the two seminars leading 
to R w G , preparing the Tanzania  country study 
fo r  it and  reading the finished product, 1 found 
two aspects of this strategy disturbing. First, it 
ap pears  to stress continuous, even, marginal change 
gradua l ly  growing into structural transformation. 
This simply does not address the question of 
w ha t  type of political coalition in peripheral 
econom ies either would wish to or would have the 
ability to institute or maintain such a trans­
fo rm a tion .  I have therefore dealt here with 
T a n z a n ia ’s stra tegy— which is not primarily linear, 
even, o r  marginal. Second, its political power 
s truc ture  and  base is neither homogenous nor as 
fragile and  narrow  as is sometimes assumed. Both 
the strategic th rust  and the power base evolution 
a p p e a r  to be critical to T anzan ia ’s adoption of 
and  persistence in a development dynamic in 
m a n y  respects similar to that of RwG, albeit one 
m u ch  m ore  overtly centred on a transition to 
socialism ra ther  than a social democratic 
approach .
T a n z a n ia  has attracted a great deal of 
a tten tion  over the eight years since the Arusha 
D eclara t ion .  It has been heralded as the precursor 
o f  social democratic  redistribution with growth 
strategies, and  written off as an example of 
inefficient state capitalist intervention; hailed as 
an  exam ple  of transition to participatory
socialism, and pilloried as ano th e r  K enya  with a 
thin rhetorical gloss. T he reasons for this are not 
hard  to find. T an zan ia ’s style of p resentation  and 
action is unusual; despite repeated predictions (or 
warnings from  friends) of one type of collapse or 
another, political and  socio-economic change 
appear to have gone fo rw ard  and been coupled 
with moderately rapid grow th in output; and both 
published data  and opportunit ies for on-the-spot 
contact are relatively good— especially for a state 
seeking radical change.
However, much of the interest has been from  
particular perspectives, notably one seeking to 
discover either the co m m e n ta to r ’s own utopia  or 
confirmation of his conviction that a social 
democratic or socialist transition to development 
is impossible; or one a ttempting to find a systemic 
pattern of change broadly  applicable elsewhere 
on the periphery; or one dedicated to quarry ing 
examples to support policies or theories without 
too much care  to examine the context in which 
they are embedded.
These approaches have certain  limitations. 
Tanzanians do not claim to have achieved their 
goals but to be in the early stages of a long 
transition, while individual policies and actions 
mean very different things in different contexts 
(e.g. wage control in Tanzania  and  in Singapore).  
The 1967-75 trends in T anzan ia  are at least as 
important for analysing the 1974-75 position and 
venturing into projections of 1975-83 as are the 
exact positions attained by the end of 1974, and 
T anzan ia ’s whole approach  to developm ent is 
based on the belief that systems can n o t  be 
imported and exported en bloc , bu t  m ust be 
analysed, adapted, modified, transfo rm ed  and 
internalized together with local ingredients. T here ­
fore, an evaluation of T anzan ia  in terms which 
are not Tanzania-centred  and particularly  as an 
’experiment’ to apply elsewhere is, fo r  many 
purposes, inappropriate.
This set of notes attempts to consider the nature 
of Tanzania 's  1967-75 dynamic from  a Tanzania- 
centric position, and to offer a few reflections on 
certain strategic elements and critical obstacles. 
Because Tanzania 's  leadership views increases in 
productive forces as critical means to attaining 
socio-political and political economic ends, ra ther 
than as overriding ends in themselves, the content 
will stress political economic elements.
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The following sketch of 1961-73 developm ent 
achievements is necessarily brief and presupposes 
some knowledge of T an zan ia .1 
T he concentra tion  on largely positive results is a 
mix of a conclusion tha t  on balance a dynamic 
tow ards developm ent,  socialism, egalitarianism 
and participation was achieved, and the needs 
of brevity; it does not imply tha t  no serious 
secondary non-achievements and mistakes exist.
1. T he  ratio  of top, public sector, pre-tax salaries 
to m in im um  wages was reduced from  80 to 1 at 
independence in 1961 to about 15 to 1 in mid- 
1974, an d  the effective purchasing pow er ratio  
from abou t  50 to 1 to under 10 to 1. A parallel 
narrowing of differentials took place th ro ug ho u t  
the wage and  salary structure. Real purchasing 
power at the top of the scales declined d ram atic ­
ally, and at the bo ttom  and middle rose 
significantly;
2. T he widening of the differential between rural 
and urban personal incomes in relative terms was 
probably  halted during  the period 1967-72 (1973- 
74 were d rought years), and  very large increases 
in expenditure  on rura l  services and  rural invest­
ment probably  led to a modest im provem ent in 
the overall r u r a l /u r b a n  balance over the same 
period;
3. Recorded em ploym ent in u rban  areas after  
1964 rose by 6-7 per cent a year—-a rate  roughly 
com parab le  to that of u rban popula tion  grow th—  
while m in im um  and middle wage purchasing 
power was raised to levels estimated at m in im um  
decent family s tandards, and  adjusted regularly;
4. T he m in im um  wage appears  to have had a 
spill-over impact on the ‘in fo rm a l’ sector— in 
D ar  es Salaam in 1971 abou t  half  this sector 
apparently  achieved m in im um  w age-earner p u r ­
chasing pow er;2
5. U ja m aa  villages— largely draw n f rom  the third 
and four th  income quintiles of the peasan t 
popula t ion— grew to abo u t  30 per cent of the 
peasant popula tion  (3 to 3.5 million) over 1967-73. 
Their  short-term  ou tpu t  effects were largely 
neutral because the supporting  capital and services 
provided were largely long-term in effect (e.g. 
education) or not readily quantifiable because the 
results would n o t  be caught in G D P  data  (e.g. 
pure water, health), or re la ted to ou tpu t  gains
1 F o r  a b r ie f  d e s c r ip t io n  see  R . H .  G r e e n ,  ‘T a n z a n ia ’, in  
R ed istr ib u tio n  w ith  G ro w th  (C h e n e ry  e l al e d s )  O U P ,  1974; 
a n d f o r  a fu lle r  an a ly s is  R . H .  G r e e n ,  T o w a rd  U jam aa and  
K u jiteg em ea : I n c o m e  D is tr ib u tio n  and A b so lu te  P o v erty  
E radication A sp ec ts  of th e  T a n za n ia  T ra n sitio n  to  S o c ia lism , 
I D S  D is c u ss io n  P a p e r  n o . 66 , 1974. A n  in te re s t in g  d e b a te ,  
‘T o w a rd s  S o c ia lism  in  T a n z a n ia — a P o s tc r ip t ’ , a p p e a r s  in  
v o lu m e  I I  of S oc ia lism  in T a n za n ia  (S a u l a n d  C liffe  e d s), 
E a s t  A fr ic a n  P u b l is h in g  H o u s e ,  N a i ro b i ,  1973.
2 S ee  M . B ie n e fe ld , 'T h e  In fo rm a l  S e c to r  a n d  P e r ip h e ra l  
C a p ita l is m : th e  C a se  o f T a n z a n ia ’, I D S  B u lle tin , v o l. 6 n o . 3 
an d  so u rc e s  c ite d  th e r e in .
which are difficult to measure  (e.g. greater peasant 
consum ption f rom  increased subsistence 
production);
6. T ogether  with villageization (1973-74) the 
U jam aa p rogram m e changed T an zan ia ’s peasant 
pattern from 15-20 per cent vil lage/80-85 per cent 
isolated homestead or ham let in the middle 1960s, 
to 65-75 per cent village/25-35 per cent scattered 
in 1975. T he social and service provision results 
were clear-cut; the p roduction  gains (via input 
provision, dissemination of knowledge, infra­
structure, organization) were still basically poten­
tial; the initial 1974 moves were very badly 
organized in some a reas ;3
7. Mass adult education  grew over 1970-74 to 
abou t 3.5 million enrolment,  over half in post­
li teracy applied courses;
8. Health  facili ty allocation began a rapid shift 
tow ard  u r b a n / r u r a l  ba lance  over 1971-73;
9. T he propor tion  of high level jobs held by 
T anzan ian  citizens rose from  about 10 per cent 
(of 5,000) in 1961 to 50 per cent (of 10,000) in 
1971, and  above 67 per cent (of 12,000-12,500) 
by 1975;
10. T he share of the parastatals  in the directly 
productive sector rose by 1974 to about 80 per 
cent of large and middle-sized businesses;4
11. T he operating cash surplus of the public 
directly-productive sector rose to about Sh600 
million (6 per cent of total G D P  or 8.5 per cent 
of m onetary  G D P )  by 1973;
12. D ecentralization— aimed at greater efficiency 
in the provision of services, development of 
production  and achievement o f  b road  participa­
tion in decision tak ing /im plem en ta t ion—was 
carried out fo r  ab o u t  half  of government 
activities and perhaps  a quarte r  of parastatal 
operations over 1971-74;
13. W orkers  Councils, Regional, District and 
W ard  D evelopment Councils, and U jam aa Village 
C omm ittees  were created as avenues to participa­
tion with very uneven and  som ewhat slow results 
over 1971-74. A lm ost all the appropriate  bodies 
existed by 1975. T he  problem s lay in their general 
lack of adequate  assertiveness, weak conceptuali­
zation of roles and the dynamics of internal 
dec is ion -tak ing /pow er b a lance ;5
3 cf. G . H y d e n ,  U ja m a a ,  V illa g e jz a tio n  a n d  R u ra l  D ev e lo p m en t 
in  T a n z a n ia ’ , O D I  R e v ie w , n o . 1 1975; ‘U n lu c k y  U jam aa’, 
E co n o m ist, 12 A p r i l  1975.
4 S ee  R . H . G r e e n ,  “ R e le v a n c e , E ffic ien cy , R o m an tic ism  and 
C o n fu s io n  in  T a n z a n ia n  P la n n in g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t”  in 
A . H . R w e y e m a m u  P u b lic  S ec to r  M an agem ent Problems 
in A fr ica , D a g  H a m m a rs k jo ld  F o u n d a t io n ,  U p p s a la  1975 for 
a m o re  d e ta i le d  p re s e n ta t io n .
5 R e s is ta n c e  o f m a n a g e rs  a n d  c iv il s e rv a n ts  is a rea l obstacle,
b u t  o n e  w h o se  s ig n if ic a n c e  t u rn s  o n  lack  o f  a sse rtio n . G iven  
th e  p o litic a l a u th o r i ty  b e h in d  p a r t ic ip a tio n ,  passiv e  resistance 
is m u c h  e a s ie r  to  s u s ta in  th a n  ac tiv e  c o n f ro n ta t io n  in  the  face 
o f  w o rk e r  o r  p e a s a n t  in it ia t iv e s .
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14. O ver 1964-73 real output rose by. about 4.5 
per cent a year (perhaps 2 per cent per capita)— 
som ew hat  above the African average and the 
T an zan ian  late colonial record (2.5 per cent) but 
below strategic, as well as formal operating guide­
line, targets;
15. O ver the same period agricultural outpu t (and 
its food subsector) grew by abou t 3 per cent a 
year— slightly above the rate of population growth 
bu t  not enough  to build a position of strength to 
resist consecutive years of unfavourable  weather 
(e.g. 1973, 1974).
In fact, the 1961-73 period has two phases—  
1961-67 and  1967-73.6 The form er was more 
F a b ian ,  technocratic and mixed-economy 
oriented, but apart  f rom  high-level m anpow er and 
ou tpu t ,  its direct contr ibution toward the results 
noted  above was either low or negative. Its 
indirect con tr ibu tion  in demonstrating the need 
fo r  strategic shifts, and building up the personnel, 
know ledge and insti tutional capacity for it, was 
m ore  positive. T he  period 1967-73 was character­
ized by a m ore  radical, more political and more 
socialist, strategy. Because this has increasingly 
evolved in response to T anzanian  perceptions of 
T a n z a n ia n  needs, with studies of foreign 
approaches  and  imports of foreign knowledge 
re la ted  to that perception, it is somewhat confus­
ing to the observer, for the process is more 
M arx ian  than  the terminology; the degress of 
discipline imposed ra ther greater than is super­
ficially evident; and  the experimentation with a 
wide range of knowledge/institutional/procedural 
im ports  ra th e r  more a deliberate policy than 
ra n d o m  pragm atism  or absent-minded ‘neutrali ty’. 
* * *
O ne special characteristic of the Tanzanian  
strategy of transition has been to use crises to 
push ahead  on basic objectives while at the same 
time in troducing  unpopular  reforms needed even 
in the absence of the crisis. In 1971 the problems 
posed by the rise of the right-wing populist regime 
in U g anda  were the occasion for a clarification, 
reassertion, and  deepening emphasis on participa­
tion, egalitarianism, and rural-oriented develop­
ment. T he  problems of the State Trading 
C o rp o ra t io n  in that year were seized upon to 
provide the springboard  for the total reform and 
decentralization  of the import-export-wholesale 
com m erc ia l  sector, and the foreign exchange crisis 
fo r  an assertion of much more effective strategic 
con tro l  over parastatals, bank  credit, imports, and 
the allocation of surplus from the productive 
sector.  T h e  1973 devaluation was m ade the 
occasion for  a tough price-control system, which
6 F o r  a f u l le r  d isc u s s io n  o f 1961-67 see  K . N g o m b a le -M w iru , 
“ T h e  A ru s h a  D e c la ra tio n ” , an d  A . d e  la R u e , “ U ja m a  o n  th e  
M a r c h ”  in , S oc ia lism  in T an zan ia , op . c it.
in legislative direction and practice was concerned 
with firm efficiency and the protection  of key 
investible surpluses as well as com m ercia l margins 
and  consum er welfare.
This approach  has been pu t to a severe test over 
1974-75.7 G ra in  price increases, the failure of the 
1973-74 short rains c rop  and a very poor harvest 
on the 1974 long rains crop, and  oil price increases 
tr immed probable  effective national purchasing 
power for 1974 by at least 10 per cent between 
Chris tm as 1973 and June  1974. Forceful a rgu ­
ments were advanced for  ‘m uddling  th rou gh ’ and 
massive retrenchment. T he  first was rejected as 
im prudent and  the second as suicidal, because it 
would probably  reverse the developm ent dynamic, 
underm ine political solidarity and  worsen the 
production  gap (in food and  basic consum er 
goods) which was the basis of the crisis.
The actual strategy elaborated  over April- 
October 1974 included:
1. Raising m in im um  and middle wages enough to 
protect real purchasing power and  increasing 
salaries by a significant am o un t (5-15 per cent), 
though not one which protected all income levels 
from the price increases;
2. Raising prices to avoid random  subsidies and 
to preserve the bulk of investible surpluses (with 
the exception of grain until October, when the 
extent of im port  volumes and  prices forced a 
deliberate interim subsidy to be abandoned);
3. Boosting producer prices to im port parity (over 
1971-73 they had fallen below this level for the 
first sustained period since the 1950s) and stepping 
up input provision (largely seed, fertilizer, 
pesticide);
4. Speeding rural transform ation  to seek patterns 
more conducive to providing know-how, educa­
tion, inputs, transport, m arketing  and, moré' 
immediately, food relief (probably a b o u t r200,000 
tonnes);
5. Concentra ting  more investment on productive 
sector projects with an immediate emphasis on 
mass market items including textiles, garments, 
cement, steel products and the pre-export p ro ­
cessing of primary products, e.g. cotton, cashew, 
hides and skins, sisal;
6. L aunching a m ajo r  emergency assistance 
campaign to secure foreign resources to cover very 
large (1974-75) and smaller projected (1975-76 and 
1976-77) interim resource gaps until better w eather 
and the pay-off on production-increasing policies 
would restore a balance.
This strategic package was fairly clearly presented 
in the 1974-75 Budget Speech and— in pa r t— in
7 F o r  a so m e w h a t fu lle r  a c c o u n t see  R . H . G r e e n ,  “ A s p e c ts  of 
W o rld  M o n e ta ry  a n d  R e s o u rc e  T r a n s f e r  S y s te m  in  1974; A 
V iew  fro m  th e  E x tre m e  P e r ip h e r y ”  in  G .  K . H e l le in e r  
A W orld  D iv id e d , C a m b rid g e  U n iv e rs i ty  P re s s ,  1975.
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the earlier and later announcem ents  of the imple­
m entation  o f  some of its components.  It m ay  not 
succeed— although, with success assured for 
interim external finance raising, and reasonable 
1975 main crops, total failure now seems most 
unlikely. W hat it clearly does dem onstra te  is a 
belief on the part of the leadership tha t  either 
slamming on the brakes or going into reverse 
would entail strains the T an zan ian  transition 
could no t survive; and  that  meeting crises could 
be used to refine the m ore  positive elements of 
governm ent strategy. It also demonstrates a 
capacity for a coherent and  rapid response to 
m ajo r  exogenous shocks and, on the part of the 
country  as a whole, a very considerable willing­
ness to take and stick to tough action, combined 
with a com m itm en t to lay as little as possible of 
the burden  on the weakest sections of the 
population.
* * *
Certain  elements of the T a n zan ia n  transition 
strategy and  political base are of greater  signifi­
cance than the a ttention  usually paid to them 
would suggest. T he  strategy has normally  been 
seen as uneven and  som ewhat erratically art icu­
lated central planning, dom inated  by European  
social democratic  or technocratic  elements. The 
political base has either been treated as self 
evidently the u rban  and rural poor  (w ithout much 
analysis), or  seen as the bureaucratic-managerial 
and  rural elites and, therefore, inherently co n tra ­
dictory to stated policies. N o ne  of these explana­
tions is very satisfactory.
T an zan ia ’s m a jo r  political economic and socio­
economic decisions are taken politically, not 
technically. In a m ajori ty  of cases a large num ber 
of technical inputs, and  a large sample of peasant 
and  w orker  opinion, have been collected by the 
T A N U  C entra l Comm ittee ,  the President a n d / o r  
the C abine t before the decision is taken. In almost 
all cases the details of im plem enta tion (subject to 
a check that they do implement, and not reverse 
the decision) have been fo rm ula ted  in processes 
involving m anagers  and  planners, bu t after the 
basic decision has been reached.
Decisions taken in response to technical proposals 
have increasingly been consolidating  steps to reap 
the benefits from, or adjust the detailed course of, 
m ajor  decisions or stop-gap measures to avoid 
serious problems until a m a jo r  decision could  be 
taken. These are marginal or incremental ra ther 
than s tructural or direction-changing, e.g. the 
April 1974 wage-salary-price package did flow 
directly f rom  initial technical proposals, b u t  the 
broader  1965-67 set of political decisions, de te r­
mining the course toward creating an egalitarian
incom e allocation fram ew ork , em anated  from the 
President.
T he political strategy has consistently turned on 
identifying a limited num ber of im portan t and 
urgent problems (immediate contradictions) 
involving b road  structural decisions aimed at 
creating a new base for developm ent (inter­
mediate synthesis), and following through by 
concentrating  resources and technical attention 
on achieving and consolidating the potential gains 
from the structural changes. This strategy quite 
explicitly denies either that incrementalism can 
be an adequate  overall approach, or that one can 
advance equally on all fronts at once. It is not 
linear. T he  n um ber of structural changes which 
can be carried out at once are limited by political, 
technical and real resource constraints, and by the 
general social, political and  external environments. 
Even had it not been transfo rm ed  into something 
else by IB R D  technicians, the President’s 1962 
village proposals could not then have formed the 
basis for a structural shift to U jam aa  villages 
(1969) or total villageization (1974-). The Arusha 
Declaration (1967) and  its initial implementation 
in respect of ownership, management,  equality and 
mass education were preconditions for the 
strategic decisions at political level of 1968 and 
1973 to be operational. Similarly, the move to a 
dominantly  public directly-productive sector, 
decided in the A rusha  Declaration, would not 
have been possible in 1961 given the capacity of 
citizen m anpow er, nor w'ould it have been possible 
had 1961-66 trends to greater inequality, more 
foreign f irm -Tanzanian  m anager links and the 
emergence of a citizen political-capitalist coalition 
been allowed to con tinue  until 1971.8
The political choice of areas fo r  structural change 
and of their sequence, backed by technical inputs, 
is not part icularly  consistent with either standard 
socialist European  models of central planning— 
as usually taught at any rate— or with Western 
academic planning strategies, which have a 
tendency to confuse the neat linear world of some 
branches of mathem atics  with the rather different 
world of political economy. T h e  process does look 
messy, does involve changes of direction, does 
lead to at least marginal waste  and failure to 
articulate, and does put very heavy and new 
pressures on technical personnel.  However, the 
alternative of incrementalism on the eve of the 
A rusha Declaration  would have meant a steadily 
increasing divergence from  the goals of egali­
tarianism, participation, and national self-reliance.
8 I t  is n o t  in te n d e d  to  im p ly  th a t  th e  e n tire  s tra te g ic  sequence 
w as seen  c le a r ly  f ro m  th e  s ta r t .  T h e  b as ic  g oa ls an d  som e 
in te rm e d ia te  p o s it io n s  w e re , b u t  o th e r  d e v e lo p m e n ts  resu lted  
f ro m  g ro w in g  e x p e r ie n c e  a n d  r e s p o n s e  to  e x te rn a l  challenges.
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Equally, a b ro ad  front approach, seeking public 
directly-productive sector dominance in 1962 and 
em bark in g  on the 1969 and 1974 U jam aa and 
D eve lopm ent Villages and the 1967 decision on 
incom e allocation frameworks at that date, would 
have resulted in vir tually immediate technical and 
political collapse. These would have been much 
less efficient results than those actually achieved. 
1 he political base issue is equally complex and 
also closely related. T A N U  is a mass party with 
a m ajori ty  of poor peasant and worker members 
and  a socialist m ajority  in its central leadership. 
It is na tional and  does possess considerable— 
albeit uneven— two-way communication, organiza­
tion and  implementation capacity at levels from 
10-House Cells upw ard .9 On the other hand, its 
s t reng th— while growing—-is not massive in 
abso lu te  terms and its local leadership— albeit 
decreasingly— is often both overly authoritarian 
and  derived from proto-rural elite groups. Its 
total dom inance  turns on the absence of any 
alternative political coalition or, indeed, any 
locally art iculated ideology around which to 
build one.
High-level m anpow er is critical to the articulation 
and  im plem enta t ion  of political decisions. A 
hostile managerial-civil service grouping could 
block, and a passively demoralised one slow, 
action. W ithou t an alternative political coalition 
this g ro u p  could hardly change the government 
nor, so long as the latter remains intellectually 
and  politically self-confident, its strategy. In 
practice the T anzan ian  public sector elite has 
accepted  severe cuts in its relative and actual 
s tan d a rd  of living, while morale and efficiency 
(while uneven) have im proved since independence, 
since A rusha  and  (after a setback in 1971-72) over 
the past two years. Internalization of the ideology 
o f  transit ion to socialism is incomplete, and 
transit ion  to participation still more so, but 
progress is neither negligible nor static.10 A 
m ajori ty  do fit Amilcar C abra l’s definition of a 
‘revo lu tionary  petty bourgeoisie ':11
“ in spite of all hostile conditions it remains 
identified with the fundam ental interests of the
9 T A N U  te c h n o c ra t ic  c a p ac ity  h a s  b e e n  k e p t  low  d e lib e ra te ly . 
I t s  p o lit ic a l  ro le  w as s e e n  as like ly  to  be  w ea k e n e d , n o t
e n h a n c e d ,  if  it c a m e  to  h av e  a p a ra lle l tec h n o c ra tic  b u re a u ­
c ra c y  a n d  to  a rg u e  te c h n ic a l po licy  d e ta ils  ra th e r  th an  set 
f r a m e w o rk s  fo r  p o lic y  a n d  c ritic ize  re su lts  in  th e  c o n te x t 
o f  th e s e  p o lit ic a l  te rm s  o f  re fe re n c e . T h is  m ay  be a  w ro n g  
d e c is io n ;  i t  is n o t  a b s e n t-m in d e d n e s s  o r  b u re a u c ra tic  sab o tag e , 
as s o m e  c r i t ic s  h a v e  im p lie d .
10 I. S h iv je  ( in  S o cia lism  in  T an zan ia , op. cit.)  g rea tly  o v e r­
e m p h a s iz e s  th e  p o w e r  of th is  p ro to -c la s s . A lm o st all o f h is
e x a m p le s  re la te  to  a lim ite d  g ro u p  of in d iv id u a ls  in  one
in s t i tu t io n ;  h is  s o u rc e s  w e re  m an a g e rs  an d  civil se rv an ts
w h o  o p p o s e d  th e m ;  h is  ta rg e ts  w e re  a lread y  th e  o b jec ts  of 
c iv il s e rv ic e  a n d  p o litic a l c ritic ism , an d  h av e  a lm o s t all b een
d e m o te d  o r  t ra n s fe r r e d  to  less c ritica l p o s itio n s .
11 B rie f  A n a ly s is  of th e  Social S tru c tu re  of G u in e a .’ R ev o lu tio n
in G u in e a , L o n d o n ,  1969.
popular masses. T o  do this it m ay  have to 
comm it suicide, but . . .  by sacrificing itself it 
can reincarnate itself in the conditions of 
workers and peasants” .
The lower rural civil service cadres and the proto- 
rural elites pose more serious potential challenges. 
They are fa r  less ready to transform  themselves 
— the lower civil servants because all they perceive 
themselves as possessing is the power to give orders 
to the masses, and the proto-ku lak  and  p ro to ­
merchant elite because all they have is an  income 
higher than their fellow peasants and  the ability 
to influence local officials.12 Here, if anywhere, is 
the foundation  for a political counter-coalition. 
But it is more a founda tion  for  delay and 
scattered resistance than for  counter-revolution. 
The African rural p roto-kulak  and p ro to ­
merchant groups can  hardly num b er  m ore  than 
50,000 households out of over 2 million; the very 
hierarchical orientation of the civil servants makes 
them at least partially responsive to national Party 
and government ideology and  policy; neither 
group is nationally  organised .13 Successive 
centrally mobilized campaigns have removed or 
weakened many bourgeois local T A N U  leaders; 
U jam aa has tended to isolate some proto-kulaks, 
remove others from the land, and incorporate  the 
remainder in villages (albeit sometimes at the 
price of their having considerable influence within 
them). Decentralization has m ade local mass 
participation possible— and less often, but to a 
growing extent, has led to it in practice— and has 
moved many more ideologically com m itted  and 
highly qualified officials, w ho do not see th em ­
selves as personally threatened by participation, 
into the regions and  districts. Villageization 
(replacing what until 1967 was an 80-85 per cent 
scattered household pattern) will fu r ther  reduce 
the rural elite’s powers of inertia, which the 
massive rural adult education p rogram m e (3.5 
million listed enrolment, or abou t 25 per cent of 
the population in 1974-75) is likely to have an 
even greater positive transform ing  power. T he 
main body of the T anzan ian  peasants has 
included, and still includes, T A N U ’s loyalest 
supporters: the basic problem s are to provide 
education and ideology to increase their 
participatory initiative, organizational capacity, 
and productive achievements.
12 cf. J . R . F in a c u n e , R ural D e v e lo p m e n t and B u reau cracy in 
T an zan ia , S c a n d in a v ia n  I n s t i tu te  of A fr ic a n  S tu d ie s ,  U p p s a la ,  
1974, fo r  a  fo rc e fu l— if p e rh a p s  o v e r  s ta t ic  a n d  th u s  p e s s i ­
m is tic — a c co u n t of th e  in te r a c t io n  in  th e  M w a n z a  R eg io n . 
M w a n z a  is o n e  of th e  fo u r  re g io n s  (K i lim a n ja ro ,  A ru s h a , 
I r in g a  a re  th e  o th e r  th re e )  w ith  th e  m o s t  p r o to -k u la k  
s tra tif ic a tio n .
13 T h e  C o -o p e ra t iv e  U n io n  o f T a n z a n ia  is a p o te n t ia l  fo cu s . 
I n  p rac tic e  it is r a th e r  w eak  a n d  h a s  s te a d ily  lo s t  in flu e n ce . 
S o m e  reg io n a l u n io n s  h a v e  b e e n  m o re  e ffe c tiv e  ru ra l  e lite  
b a ses  of p o w e r  an d  a re n a s  o f  a t t e m p ts  to  r e d u c e  th a t  
p o w er.
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Organized labour in T an zan ia  (about 500,000) is 
very much integrated into T A N U  organiza tion­
ally. Because egalitarianism has m eant the growth 
of purchasing power fo r  m in im um  and  middle-
wage earners, and even the first steps toward
worker participation and mass adult education 
have increased h u m an  dignity and status,
organized workers accept the Party 's  basic 
ideology and the governm ent’s basic policies. 
Differences have been occasional and relatively 
low key (compared, say, with the United
Kingdom). T he  N ational Union of Tanzan ian  
W orkers (N U T A ) is not perhaps very efficient 
either at building worker partic ipation or present­
ing worker needs very clearly and cogently ,14 
but it is a par t  of  the ruling coalition bo th  now 
and in the foreseeable future, and  in that respect 
does represent the vast m ajori ty  of its members. 
T he in form al sector15 poses problems. T an z an ia ’s 
leadership is com m itted  to preventing the em er­
gence of a medium or large-scale A frican  private 
sector. In the absence of such a sector it sees the 
possibility of utilizing the resident Asian and 
foreign capitalist sectors during the transition, 
because these can be cut off f rom  any local 
business/civil  service alliances. T he small-scale 
African proto-capitalist sector cannot,  therefore, 
be allowed to expand dramatically  either in unit 
size or sectoral importance.
W hether to provide some assistance, or  at any 
rate channel some purchases to the informal 
sector is debated. T he W orkers  and  Peasants 
Housing Fund  set up channels designed to allow 
workers to use informal sector con trac tors  w ho 
are cheaper and quicker; the Small Industries 
Development O rganizat ion  is not strictly limited 
to regional,  district and  w orkers’ co-operative 
unit support. O ne reason for  this som ewhat 
ambivalent a tt itude (and for the much  slower 
phasing out of middle and  small Asian business­
men than in Kenya) is the problems confron ting  
building u p  small-scale public sector units. 
Decentralization to regional,  district and  co ­
operative level in trade, transport ,  repair  services 
and simple m anufac tu r ing  has begun, but is not 
seen as achieving m a jo r  b reak throughs, at least 
in the last two areas, until the 1980s. In the
14 A p p a re n tly  th e  1974 w a g e s /p r ic e s  p a c k a g e , like  its  1969 
a n d  1972 p re d e c e s s o rs ,  w as fo rm u la te d  as a T r e a s u r y  
p ro p o sa l  m u c h  m o re  in  re s p o n s e  to  o v e ra ll  T A N U  g oals 
a n d  th e i r  in te r a c t io n  w ith  re s o u rc e  p o s s ib i li tie s  th a n  o n  th e  
b as is  o f  sp ec if ic  N U T A  p ro p o sa ls .  I n d e e d ,  th e r e  is a  c e r ta in  
iro n y  in  th e  a b n o rm a lly  lo w  lev e l o f  b ro a d  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  
fo rm u la t in g  th e  m a in  1 9 69-74  tax , p r ic e , w a g e  p o lic y  i n s t r u ­
m e n ts  d e s ig n e d  a n d  u s e d  to  p ro m o te  e g a li ta r ia n is m . T h e  
f ra m e w o rk  w as th e  P a r ty ’s a n d  th e  P r e s id e n t ’s b u t  th e  
r e s p o n s e — w h ile  c le a r ly  e n th u s ia s t ic  a n d  r e le v a n t— d o e s  n o t 
s e em  to  h av e  b e e n  in fo rm e d  b y  v e ry  b ro a d  c o n s u lta tio n  or 
o p in io n  c o lle c tio n .
15 cf. B ie n e fe ld , o p . c it .
meantime, the inform al sector is needed and half 
encouraged, but also seen as a potential danger 
if allowed to develop into a capitalist class.
* * *
T he  continuation  of T an zan ia ’s transition to 
decentralized, participatory, egalitarian socialist 
development faces m ajo r  obstacles. Margins for 
e rror are very low in terms of productive forces, 
institutional capacity, and high level manpower. 
T he ability to m ake  and to recover from serious 
errors is available only to middle and high-income 
countr ies, or to those with high levels of centrally- 
controlled coercive forces. At the same time, 
exogenous forces place the implementation of 
national decisions at fa r  greater risk than in 
larger, less externally dependent,  a n d /o r  less poor 
countries. For example, the cost of the 1973-74 
drought,  grain price rises over 1972-73 and the 
oil price escalation over 1973-74 represented a 
loss of at least 10 per cent in real purchasing 
power of national ou tpu t in 1974.
Because the success of the transition rests on 
continued progress requiring  a series of structural 
changes, m arginal e rrors  are inevitable and major 
ones difficult to avoid, with the implied corollary 
that corrective action must be rapid and rapidly 
effective, despite the limitations of data, and of 
hum an, institutional and comm unicat ion  capacity 
fo r  learning abou t  and  identifying errors or 
fo rm ula t ing  and  im plem enting  responses.
T he degree of shared national purpose and of self 
discipline achieved to date is uneven. Compared 
to most peripheral economic units it is high and 
growing, bu t  com pared  with either a Scandinavian 
coun try  or C hina  it rem ains low. In the absence 
of decisive coercive force available to the govern­
ment, and the presence of a commitment to 
b roadening participation, the raising of the levels 
of perceived national purpose  and  self-discipline 
is a critical strategic requirem ent,  and the present 
levels a significant constraint.
T he balance between the m in im um  rate of 
progress necessary to prevent a reversal of the 
dynamic of transit ion and  the maximum rate 
objectively possible (for political as well as 
materia l and  h u m an  resource reasons) is a very 
fine one. T he  selection, timing and  sequence of 
structural changes is critical, as is the adequate 
consolidation of the potential gains from 
structural changes which will, in the absence of 
consolidation, slip backw ard  from  reality to 
rhetoric.
T he tension between broadening  informed parti­
cipation th rough  education  and ideology, and 
imposing change on a Platonic guardianship model 
is extremely severe— especially in the case of 
radical intellectuals and  technicians who appear
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to have less historical perspective and hum an 
contac t with mass individuals than the dominant 
radical politicians and managers. Luisscz faire  will 
not b ring systemic change; centralized dirigisme 
w ill not create participatory, egalitarian socialism, 
liberating workers and peasants. The intermediate 
syntheses, temporarily  resolving aspects of this 
con trad ic t ion , are partial, unsatisfactory and 
subject to change not because the ones chosen 
are usually  unsound, but because of the inherent 
n a tu re  of the tension.16
1 hese are not obstacles unique to Tanzania. 1 hey 
are alm ost certain to confront any sustained ell ort 
to achieve a transit ion either to participatory 
socialist developm ent or to a social-democratic 
varian t of redistr ibution with growth. A number 
o f  them  would appear in quite different form for 
a coali tion  seeking to achieve or consolidate power 
to institute such a transition, or for a ruling 
coali tion seeking a quite different pattern of 
g row th, stability a n d / o r  development. The 
obstacles are dominantly  political, economic and 
socio-economic; the augmentation and allocation 
o f  productive capacity and material resources are 
critical elements in. and constraints on, transition 
to developm ent,  but by no means the only ones, 
no r  even, in each individual instance, the most 
im po rtan t  ones.
O n the face of it the list of obstacles might suggest 
either tha t  T an z an ia ’s transition cannot continue, 
or  tha t  it is the result of some fortuitous accident 
and cann o t  be repeated. That is probably too 
facile a conclusion. Tanzania  has managed to 
ba lance  the necessary and the possible for over 
13 years while building up an increasingly clear 
developm ent strategy and dynamic, and has done 
so despite (indeed in part in the process of) 
meeting several serious crises. If a description of 
T an zan ia  as it is in 1975 had been offered as a 
projec tion  in the months immediately before or 
a f te r  the A rusha  Declaration it would (quite 
rightly  perhaps) have been rejected as impossible. 
A serious in ternal misjudgment a n d /o r  a con­
ca tena tion  of exogenous events could have 
des troyed— and could still destroy—T anzan ia ’s 
developm ent dynamic. Economically, socially and 
politically, T anzan ia  is very small, has limited 
resilience and is therefore fragile. However, 
collapse is ra ther  less likely today than in 1968. 
Equally , a quiet sliding back into a more 
heirarchical, elite-oriented pattern has become
16 T h e  sa m e  ty p e  o f  su ccessiv e  c o n tra d ic tio n s  w ith  successive  
p a r t ia l  s y n th e s is  re q u ir in g  a m e n d m e n t an d  re -b a la n c in g  in  a 
z ig zag  a d v a n c e  is v e ry  e v id e n t in  th e  cases of C h in a  an d  of 
Y u g o s la v ia . T o  a le s se r  d e g re e  (p a rtly  b e c au se  of lim its  
p o s e d  b y  a c tu a l  o r  p o te n tia l  ex te rn a l in te rv en tio n )  th ey  can 
b e  fa ir ly  re a d ily  id e n tif ie d  in  C zech o s lo v ak ia , H u n g a ry  and 
P o la n d .
steadily less probable  from  1967 on w ard — the 
opposite forces have built up a history, a dynamic 
and a sense of victory.
Clearly Tanzania  is un ique and  the T anzan ian  
transit ion canno t be an export-oriented  industry. 
These are ra ther trivial propositions because no 
two states, no two governing coalitions (or their 
means of securing and consolidating power), and 
therefore— no two transit ions to developm ent 
are identical. However, if T anzan ia  is today 
radically atypical of the smallest, poores t  states 
this is a result, much  more than a cause, of  the 
road it took from 1961-75. T h e  present na tu re  of 
T anzan ia ’s ruling coalition and of the organized 
(or quasi-organized) forces behind it is no t w hat 
it was 13 years ago, any m ore  than levels and 
targets of income distribution, external dependency 
or productive forces have rem ained  unchanged.
This suggests tha t  the b ro ad  pattern  of the 
T anzanian  transition is of interest to any group 
seeking to begin or continue  a rapid, bu t basically 
non-violent, transition to egalitarian, partic ipatory  
socialism (or perhaps to the social-democratic 
variant of redistr ibution with grow'th). While part 
of the pattern would be irrelevant to a political 
coalition achieving power by arm ed revolution 
(e.g. Mozam bique) a n um ber of elements would 
not: a revolution does not create a tabula  rasa 
with all internal and external constraints removed, 
nor permit totally direct and  linear sequences.17
Picking out particular program m es or policies to 
drop into quite different political economic and 
socio-economic contexts and dynamics is ano ther  
matter. A few might be transp lan tab le— e.g. in the 
directly-productive public enterprise sector; others 
would either wither and die or be t ransform ed in 
rather odd ways— contrast mass ru ra l  education 
in Tanzania  and in K e n y a ;18 and som e— if really 
implemented— would be quite unexpectedly 
explosive— e.g. the com bined  tax-salary-wage 
policy. This conclusion is not surpising in the 
context of Tanzania .  One aspect of T anzan ian  
self-reliance has been a growing conviction that 
neither random  selection of policies-programmes- 
techniques from quite disparate  systems, nor 
attempts to im port large chunks  of foreign 
systems, was either possible or desirable w ithout 
systematic prior study by T anzan ian s  of the 
T anzanian  context, and resultant rejection or 
modification of the imports, com bined  with the 
development of T an za n ia ’s own know ledge and 
its capacity to apply it.
17 T h e  o b v io u s  e x a m p le  is C h in a — see th e  p a p e r  in  th is  issu e  
by  J o h n  G it tin g s .
18 S ee fo r e x a m p le  th e  a rt ic le s  b y  M a r t in  G o d f re y  a n d  G .C .M . 
M u tis o  a n d  by  B u d d  H a l l  in I D S  B u lletin  v o l. 6 n o . 3.
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The major aim of the Bulletin is to pub lish  brief and d irec t— sometimes 
p rovoca tive— artic les on themes of curren t im portance  to those concerned 
w ith p rob lem s of development: students, teachers, and, above all, p rac t i­
t ioners  and adm in istrators and civil servants who rarely have much time 
to spare. Hence no scho lar ly  reviews of the l i terature on the subjects 
b roached, a m in imum of footnotes and com press ion  of often complex 
arguments. Editorial po licy  must, therefore, be quite  d ifferent from that of 
a pro fessiona l journal. But despite these self- imposed l im itations, the 
Bulletin tr ies to maintain r igorous s tandards of argument. Taking advantage 
of rapid pub lica tion  techn iques it seeks to fill the gap between the major 
p ro fessiona l journa ls  and the journa lism  of newspapers and period ica ls.
The Bulletin is intended mainly to reflect the w ork  and interests of the 
Institute, by confron ting  those top ics  curren t ly  under d iscussion. It does 
not necessari ly  reflect the range or balance of these debates, or the views 
of the Institute.
The Bulletin is not the only channel th rough which research undertaken 
at IDS is com m unicated. An updated edition of the Register of UK-based 
ongoing research in development studies will be pub lished in 1976. Two 
series of occas iona l papers are produced: Discussion Papers and Com­
munications. A curren t List of IDS Publications, and a larger List of Writings 
on Development Studies by IDS Members is obta inab le  from Research 
Pub lica t ions  Services Limited, V ictoria  Hall, Greenwich, London SE10 ORF.
P r in te d  b y  C o -o p e ra t iv e  P re ss  L td .,  M a n c h e s te r  a n d  L o n d o n .
